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IBB’s Speech to the Electoral Reform Committee In Nigeria
Translations available in: English (original) | French | Spanish | Italian | German | Portuguese | Swedish | Russian | Dutch | Arabic

IBB’s Speech to the Electoral Reform Committee In Nigeria


I submit for discussion the speech delivered by His Excellency Gen. Ibrahim B. Babangida, GCFR, Mni, to the Justice Muhammed Uwais (Rtd), former CJN of Nigeria led Electoral Reform Committee when they visited Minna, Niger State for Public discussions, on July 22, 2008.

It is on record that Babangida’s regime orchestrated to completion and annulled a successful election held on June 12, 1993. He has since accepted responsibility for the annulment without equivocation, however, as a citizen of Nigeria and a former President; he has a constitutional right to express his opinion on such an important discourse. Kindly read on. “It is about issues and not individuals.”

This also affords Babangida’s friends the opportunity to read his position on the issue of electoral reforms as well as give his traducers additional opportunity to vent their anger; it is therapeutic indeed….so let’s rumble.

####
The Chairman,
Electoral Reform Committee.

MEMORANDUM

Electoral Reform and the Party System, Notes for Interactive Discourse Felicitation and Introduction

I wish to express our pleasure and sense of privilege and honour for your coming over here for this interactive discourse. Both the subject matter and purpose of our meeting represent one area of our experience in the rare privilege of governance in our country.

Nigeria is a highly blessed nation by the Almighty, but people and the leaders at any point in history have had to cope and will continue to cope, with daunting challenges. Governance is not easy, neither is it extraordinary difficult. It is the amount and quality of knowledge, focus, sensibility and grasp of the challenges that can make a difference. We believe that there may be no dispute about our knowledge of our country and of our experience in its governance. However, it must be emphasized that the regime, which it was our privilege to lead, was one of dictatorship. Nonetheless, that regime was driven by vision of history of our people and of political challenges. Accordingly, the regime had a mission to create the necessary institutions, structures, processes and environment for a much better system of government to exist. The regime had a “controlled environment” by the fact of military dictatorship, yet if possessed a clear purpose with observance of basic freedoms and human rights as well as the consciousness to maintain the country’s federal society and federal system of government. It also established the policy basis and structures for a new and better national economy from day one that was inherited. The same thing can be said about country’s foreign policy and international relations.

We are engaged in this discuss in, and for a different governance regime from the one we utilized for the country. There may be defects in the present constitution but the country is being governed under a constitutional regime, democracy and federation. The present ruling class cannot tamper with the system arbitrarily even if with noble causes as it is possible under the military. There is a lot to inform us about our past, but we cannot lose consciousness about the limitations of democracy and constitutional government.

REFLECTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS:
Against the preceding introductions, we wish to draw attention to some lessons and make suggestions, which may be of use in your deliberations.

Imperative of the Environment of Elections: Aside from the cancellation of the result of the June 12, 1993 Presidential Election which is not the subject matter of this discourse, you are likely to agree with us that the elections conducted under my watch between 1989 and 1992 were generally free, fair, acceptable and credible. One of the many success factors of those elections is the environment. The environment, which we utilized for the elections under our regime, may be described as one of “guided democracy.” There is another element in that environment, namely the absence of undue partisanship. It is common knowledge that power incumbency or the power system is always interested in succession elections. But this element is more apparent and brazen under governments of elected rulers. It is therefore easy to understand why elections conducted by the military when they are exiting from power have been much freer and more credible than elections conducted by Nigerians when the rulers are members of one political party. The problem, which this factor poses in how, the credibility of the national framework and of the role of elections in sustaining proper democracy can be guaranteed through succession elections by politician rulers.

We have raised this important issue of environment of elections so that you may wish, after this deliberation; bring into your recommendations the need to sanitize the environment of elections (I will return to this element again below).

We hear these days about the need to return to what, under our watch, we called ‘Modified Open Ballot System’ in elections. This is simply a big phrase for Secret Ballot. We still believe that Nigeria should continue with the Secret Ballot (or Modified Open Ballot System). But this can succeed only if the environment of elections is properly sanitized. This observation and suggestion applies to what we called ‘Option A4’, particularly for party primaries. We believe ‘Option A4’ is good again only if the environment is sanitized. Today in large sections of the country, the use of dangerous weapons including sophisticated arms and ammunitions have become commonplace spectacles. If the environment is not sanitized, any criminally minded fanatic or thug or even those who see every election as the ‘last election’ (what some people call “do or die election”), the venue of conducting party primaries or actual elections can easily be disrupted by the use of guns or any other weapons of threat to life.

The issue of how to fully harness and use the people’s ballot or vote came up for discussion during our regime. This is whether we should continue the ‘first-pass-the-post’; or to adopt proportional representation in which the contesting political parties can be allocated seats in the legislature or in the executive, which are proportional to the votes obtained by them at elections. The fear, to which we subscribe, is that proportional representation may even provide tensed and fractious environment of quarrel and hostility in the calculations of fractions of the vote involved. We therefore subscribe to what has been with us ‘first-pass-the-post’ in winning elections.

We think the emerging factor of staggered election is good for the system. The logistics, security and other items of elections, which create tensions in the one general election, may be reduced. We are therefore persuaded that elections should be staggered whether according to the present geopolitical zones or any permutations and arrangement which makes it easier for elections to be conducted with adequate and concentrated attention of local, national and even international interests. Incidentally, the valuable decisions of the Supreme Court in recent times will now make if possible for elections in many states to be conducted only in those states that have duly completed their stipulated tenures after the re-run elections.

On Election Management Body
Two issues strike me about the body or institution, which manages elections. We recall clearly the work of the Political Bureau (1987) and its recommendations. We deliberately called the body then National Electoral Commission (NEC) as different from Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) to emphasize the national nature and character of its responsibilities and mandate.

Here, we may recall the historic contention and tension between the structures and values of unity on the one hand, and those of our federal society or diversity or the other. These structures and values were basic to the reforms of the political process and governance during the regime under our watch.

Incidentally, the regime of Gen. Sani Abacha also retained the same focus and called the body NECON. The same has been carried forward to the fourth Republic. While the present body is also described ‘Independent’ we operated even within the limits of our military regime the “independence” of NEC.

The issue of interest is whether this body should be the only one under the system of federalism to conduct elections for the national executive and legislative branches, state executive and legislative branches and local government executive and legislative branches; or whether in compliance with the principles of federalism there should be two bodies as we have in the 1999 Constitution or indeed we should have three bodies each to be national, state and local government elections.

Whichever framework is adopted, we need to bear in mind that there are advantages and disadvantages. The Nigerian Nation and the Democracy Project are still being forged. We need therefore to cultivate a sense of balance between institutions that have national focus and those that have state and local government bearings in obedience to the Nigerian federal society.

Our reflection since 1993 is to allow federalism much more space in the politics and governance of our country without the tendency for undue nationalization of the political process. There is nothing wrong if the Election Management Body can be organized for national elections, state elections and local government elections independent of one another, provided however that the implications for fairness, mutual interest rather than destructive partisanship are borne in mind.

The second issue is the composition of the Election Management Body. We adopted during our time – and this has been followed up today – the minimum number of national commissioners under a Chairman. We are aware, as we were then, that the commissioners could be selected to reflect the states (and this was what FEDECO was) or to reflect membership of the political parties. In the case of the last suggestion, it can be most difficult to deal with fifty political parties.

We suggest that the composition of the Election Management Body should continue to be by a carefully selected number of Nigerian men and women who appear not to be too partisan and possessing credible antecedents of either public or private services to Nigeria. Such composition can be undertaken at the national, state and local government levels as we have just suggested.

On the Political Party System:
The issues here are many. One is that of the number of political parties. In obedience to the constitutional provisions and of course, the expectations of democracy, we can allow the free flow of the formation of political parties without any limitation on the number. This is quite attractive particularly in the possibility that a small political party with credible ideologies and commitment can grow over time if it is continuously funded to become formidable political party.

But like many other aspects of our society, the free flow of party formation can easily create chaos. We know that some political parties as registered today have no existence beyond the registration certificates in the pockets of their owners. They are like the ownership of petrol stations, which have business when there is fuel and no business when there is no fuel. In the case of the political parties, they are even aided by the constitutional requirements, which compel INEC to regularly provide them “free fund.”

Can we not continue even in the face of democracy to regulate the formation of political parties? Our feelings are that, perhaps unlike what we did under military rule in 1989, there should be a process of each election (national, state nor local elections) with stipulations which political parties should meet failure of which they can be weeded out from the system or be ‘de-registered.’

There is the issue of internal democracy of the political parties. This is a huge problem. But how can we have internal democracy within the parties when the national political process is not really democratized. It is well known that just as party primaries are captured by individuals in power and money, so also the national political process with reference to elections are captured by individuals with money and other non democratic resources.

We have in my mind what everybody calls political godfathers and godmothers or garrison commanders within the political process. It is a matter, which your Panel will have to deal with. We have only raised the issue because there is logical relationship between lack of democracy in the political process and lack of democracy in the political parties.

The last issues are those of transparency and funding of the political parties. Like internal democracy, these issues are products of the political process. We enjoin you, therefore, to deliberate on the intricacies and dialectics of how the reform of the political process and elections can be made to positively impact on the reform of the internal operations of the political parties.

CONCLUSION
I thank all of you for coming. I wish you success in the discharge of the responsibilities of your assignment.

August 13, 2008 | 9:09 AM Comments  0 comments
Tags:


IBB’s Speech to the Electoral Reform Committee In Nigeria
Translations available in: English (original) | French | Spanish | Italian | German | Portuguese | Swedish | Russian | Dutch | Arabic

IBB’s Speech to the Electoral Reform Committee In Nigeria


I submit for discussion the speech delivered by His Excellency Gen. Ibrahim B. Babangida, GCFR, Mni, to the Justice Muhammed Uwais (Rtd), former CJN of Nigeria led Electoral Reform Committee when they visited Minna, Niger State for Public discussions, on July 22, 2008.

It is on record that Babangida’s regime orchestrated to completion and annulled a successful election held on June 12, 1993. He has since accepted responsibility for the annulment without equivocation, however, as a citizen of Nigeria and a former President; he has a constitutional right to express his opinion on such an important discourse. Kindly read on. “It is about issues and not individuals.”

This also affords Babangida’s friends the opportunity to read his position on the issue of electoral reforms as well as give his traducers additional opportunity to vent their anger; it is therapeutic indeed….so let’s rumble.

####
The Chairman,
Electoral Reform Committee.

MEMORANDUM

Electoral Reform and the Party System, Notes for Interactive Discourse Felicitation and Introduction

I wish to express our pleasure and sense of privilege and honour for your coming over here for this interactive discourse. Both the subject matter and purpose of our meeting represent one area of our experience in the rare privilege of governance in our country.

Nigeria is a highly blessed nation by the Almighty, but people and the leaders at any point in history have had to cope and will continue to cope, with daunting challenges. Governance is not easy, neither is it extraordinary difficult. It is the amount and quality of knowledge, focus, sensibility and grasp of the challenges that can make a difference. We believe that there may be no dispute about our knowledge of our country and of our experience in its governance. However, it must be emphasized that the regime, which it was our privilege to lead, was one of dictatorship. Nonetheless, that regime was driven by vision of history of our people and of political challenges. Accordingly, the regime had a mission to create the necessary institutions, structures, processes and environment for a much better system of government to exist. The regime had a “controlled environment” by the fact of military dictatorship, yet if possessed a clear purpose with observance of basic freedoms and human rights as well as the consciousness to maintain the country’s federal society and federal system of government. It also established the policy basis and structures for a new and better national economy from day one that was inherited. The same thing can be said about country’s foreign policy and international relations.

We are engaged in this discuss in, and for a different governance regime from the one we utilized for the country. There may be defects in the present constitution but the country is being governed under a constitutional regime, democracy and federation. The present ruling class cannot tamper with the system arbitrarily even if with noble causes as it is possible under the military. There is a lot to inform us about our past, but we cannot lose consciousness about the limitations of democracy and constitutional government.

REFLECTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS:
Against the preceding introductions, we wish to draw attention to some lessons and make suggestions, which may be of use in your deliberations.

Imperative of the Environment of Elections: Aside from the cancellation of the result of the June 12, 1993 Presidential Election which is not the subject matter of this discourse, you are likely to agree with us that the elections conducted under my watch between 1989 and 1992 were generally free, fair, acceptable and credible. One of the many success factors of those elections is the environment. The environment, which we utilized for the elections under our regime, may be described as one of “guided democracy.” There is another element in that environment, namely the absence of undue partisanship. It is common knowledge that power incumbency or the power system is always interested in succession elections. But this element is more apparent and brazen under governments of elected rulers. It is therefore easy to understand why elections conducted by the military when they are exiting from power have been much freer and more credible than elections conducted by Nigerians when the rulers are members of one political party. The problem, which this factor poses in how, the credibility of the national framework and of the role of elections in sustaining proper democracy can be guaranteed through succession elections by politician rulers.

We have raised this important issue of environment of elections so that you may wish, after this deliberation; bring into your recommendations the need to sanitize the environment of elections (I will return to this element again below).

We hear these days about the need to return to what, under our watch, we called ‘Modified Open Ballot System’ in elections. This is simply a big phrase for Secret Ballot. We still believe that Nigeria should continue with the Secret Ballot (or Modified Open Ballot System). But this can succeed only if the environment of elections is properly sanitized. This observation and suggestion applies to what we called ‘Option A4’, particularly for party primaries. We believe ‘Option A4’ is good again only if the environment is sanitized. Today in large sections of the country, the use of dangerous weapons including sophisticated arms and ammunitions have become commonplace spectacles. If the environment is not sanitized, any criminally minded fanatic or thug or even those who see every election as the ‘last election’ (what some people call “do or die election”), the venue of conducting party primaries or actual elections can easily be disrupted by the use of guns or any other weapons of threat to life.

The issue of how to fully harness and use the people’s ballot or vote came up for discussion during our regime. This is whether we should continue the ‘first-pass-the-post’; or to adopt proportional representation in which the contesting political parties can be allocated seats in the legislature or in the executive, which are proportional to the votes obtained by them at elections. The fear, to which we subscribe, is that proportional representation may even provide tensed and fractious environment of quarrel and hostility in the calculations of fractions of the vote involved. We therefore subscribe to what has been with us ‘first-pass-the-post’ in winning elections.

We think the emerging factor of staggered election is good for the system. The logistics, security and other items of elections, which create tensions in the one general election, may be reduced. We are therefore persuaded that elections should be staggered whether according to the present geopolitical zones or any permutations and arrangement which makes it easier for elections to be conducted with adequate and concentrated attention of local, national and even international interests. Incidentally, the valuable decisions of the Supreme Court in recent times will now make if possible for elections in many states to be conducted only in those states that have duly completed their stipulated tenures after the re-run elections.

On Election Management Body
Two issues strike me about the body or institution, which manages elections. We recall clearly the work of the Political Bureau (1987) and its recommendations. We deliberately called the body then National Electoral Commission (NEC) as different from Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) to emphasize the national nature and character of its responsibilities and mandate.

Here, we may recall the historic contention and tension between the structures and values of unity on the one hand, and those of our federal society or diversity or the other. These structures and values were basic to the reforms of the political process and governance during the regime under our watch.

Incidentally, the regime of Gen. Sani Abacha also retained the same focus and called the body NECON. The same has been carried forward to the fourth Republic. While the present body is also described ‘Independent’ we operated even within the limits of our military regime the “independence” of NEC.

The issue of interest is whether this body should be the only one under the system of federalism to conduct elections for the national executive and legislative branches, state executive and legislative branches and local government executive and legislative branches; or whether in compliance with the principles of federalism there should be two bodies as we have in the 1999 Constitution or indeed we should have three bodies each to be national, state and local government elections.

Whichever framework is adopted, we need to bear in mind that there are advantages and disadvantages. The Nigerian Nation and the Democracy Project are still being forged. We need therefore to cultivate a sense of balance between institutions that have national focus and those that have state and local government bearings in obedience to the Nigerian federal society.

Our reflection since 1993 is to allow federalism much more space in the politics and governance of our country without the tendency for undue nationalization of the political process. There is nothing wrong if the Election Management Body can be organized for national elections, state elections and local government elections independent of one another, provided however that the implications for fairness, mutual interest rather than destructive partisanship are borne in mind.

The second issue is the composition of the Election Management Body. We adopted during our time – and this has been followed up today – the minimum number of national commissioners under a Chairman. We are aware, as we were then, that the commissioners could be selected to reflect the states (and this was what FEDECO was) or to reflect membership of the political parties. In the case of the last suggestion, it can be most difficult to deal with fifty political parties.

We suggest that the composition of the Election Management Body should continue to be by a carefully selected number of Nigerian men and women who appear not to be too partisan and possessing credible antecedents of either public or private services to Nigeria. Such composition can be undertaken at the national, state and local government levels as we have just suggested.

On the Political Party System:
The issues here are many. One is that of the number of political parties. In obedience to the constitutional provisions and of course, the expectations of democracy, we can allow the free flow of the formation of political parties without any limitation on the number. This is quite attractive particularly in the possibility that a small political party with credible ideologies and commitment can grow over time if it is continuously funded to become formidable political party.

But like many other aspects of our society, the free flow of party formation can easily create chaos. We know that some political parties as registered today have no existence beyond the registration certificates in the pockets of their owners. They are like the ownership of petrol stations, which have business when there is fuel and no business when there is no fuel. In the case of the political parties, they are even aided by the constitutional requirements, which compel INEC to regularly provide them “free fund.”

Can we not continue even in the face of democracy to regulate the formation of political parties? Our feelings are that, perhaps unlike what we did under military rule in 1989, there should be a process of each election (national, state nor local elections) with stipulations which political parties should meet failure of which they can be weeded out from the system or be ‘de-registered.’

There is the issue of internal democracy of the political parties. This is a huge problem. But how can we have internal democracy within the parties when the national political process is not really democratized. It is well known that just as party primaries are captured by individuals in power and money, so also the national political process with reference to elections are captured by individuals with money and other non democratic resources.

We have in my mind what everybody calls political godfathers and godmothers or garrison commanders within the political process. It is a matter, which your Panel will have to deal with. We have only raised the issue because there is logical relationship between lack of democracy in the political process and lack of democracy in the political parties.

The last issues are those of transparency and funding of the political parties. Like internal democracy, these issues are products of the political process. We enjoin you, therefore, to deliberate on the intricacies and dialectics of how the reform of the political process and elections can be made to positively impact on the reform of the internal operations of the political parties.

CONCLUSION
I thank all of you for coming. I wish you success in the discharge of the responsibilities of your assignment.

August 13, 2008 | 9:00 AM Comments  0 comments
Tags:


Mbeki, the Bull in the China Shop, and Jeering Nabobs
Translations available in: English (original) | French | Spanish | Italian | German | Portuguese | Swedish | Russian | Dutch | Arabic

Mbeki, the Bull in the China Shop, and Jeering Nabobs


Yes, Mbeki’s “quiet diplomacy” and “hand-holding” worked.
We must give him credit.

Going by the snide remarks being made by some foreign observers, one would think that President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa instigated the present crisis in Zimbabwe. A welter of critical voices, mostly Western and some Africans too, continue to bash Mbeki's facilitator role, and his so-called “quiet diplomacy” on Zimbabwe; however, he has been nonplussed, if not totally indifferent to such criticisms. Mbeki has continued with his facilitators’ effort, which on 21 July yielded its first dividend, with the signing of an MOU by ZANU-PF and the two MDC factions.

Well before the breakthrough, many believed, as was pointedly expressed by a representative of the United States, that Mbeki was on the wrong side of history. How imperceptive? Perhaps, it is either that when it comes to Africa many Westerners no longer read history or that they just do not care. If they did, they would recall that Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai, the two key players in the Zimbabwe saga, despite living in the same city, had not met face-to-face since 1999. President Mbeki made the long elusive meeting a reality.

It is a matter of deep irony that Westerners continue to query the efficacy of Mbeki’s efforts. First, they overlook the fact that his involvement in Zimbabwe was a moral imperative. Second, they neglect the fact that Mr. Mbeki has been acting on behalf of the SADC, which asked him to undertake the task in 2007, and clearly, without any established timeframe. Third, those jeering nabobs who have become latter-day champions of good governance in Zimbabwe act as if it is only they that appreciate Zimbabwe’s dyspeptic mood. Finally, it is evident that many of those who chastise President Mbeki do not exactly know the man.

It should be understood, that for Mbeki, diplomacy like politics, will always be a counterintuitive act, due to personal insights and deep-seated convictions. Whereas public opinion matters, in the end, the political actor is responsible for his decisions and their eventual outcome. Mbeki’s critics also seem to forget, proximity aside, that South Africa and Zimbabwe are two nations bound by a common destiny in that they share the historical legacy of apartheid. But there is more about Mbeki, which might shed some light on his approach in Zimbabwe. Here, a backgrounder is perhaps inevitable.

Thabo Mbeki is not Nelson Mandela. He would also not aspire to that role. Though fate conspired to force him into Mandela’s shoes, he knows too well that he could never fill it or match the size and giant footprints of iconic Mandela. But certainly, Thabo Mbeki is his own man; a fact many seem to grudgingly refuse to accept. Behind his quiet mane and near docile facade, is a well-honed and politically savvy mind and a strong but deceptive mettle.

Thabo Mbeki prizes the value of persuasion, listening and acting with cautious haste. Those who misinterpret such deliberateness, do so at their own peril. He is also a very dogged negotiator and a patient one at that. Many find this trait very frustrating, especially in a former freedom fighter. But it also goes to show that they do not know the man they are dealing with.

For most of his professional diplomatic career, and well before active politics, Mbeki was a petitioner for the African National Congress (ANC). Often treated as a supplicant than as a genuine interlocutor and representative of his oppressed and disenfranchised people, he had no choice but to learn the value of tenacity and patience. Frequently hiding behind his ubiquitous pipe and the smoke it vented, he became over the years, an adroit listener as his interlocutors pontificated, lectured, commiserated and sometimes patronized him and his ANC colleagues and their cause. But in the main, Mbeki remains a consummate diplomat and consensus-builder – a fact that is lost to some who believe that he is a vacillator, but only shy from publicly calling him such, least they offend the sensibilities of his much valued nation.

One thing Thabo Mbeki is not is a pretender. He is also not a panderer. He will not do things to please the major powers, his compatriots, admirers and adversaries. Rather, he will do the things that he believes in. Often, he would shut up, plugging his mouth and voice with his pipe. At other times, he would drum his fingers on the table top or side, while giving his audience his rapt attention. To misread such a demeanor as ambivalence or not being engaged is fatally dangerous, politically speaking.

Mbeki knows that peace, like victory is priceless. Hence, the cost or the time it takes to achieve a negotiated and sustainable settlement is therefore immaterial. He also knows, that to achieve ones ultimate end, you have to fully allow the opponents to show their hands, reveal their thoughts and unveils their strategy. More importantly, he understands the imperative of collaborative negotiations and the role of a facilitator, which inevitably, includes allowing the parties to have a sense of ownership of the process as well as the end results. If there is one other critical variable that Mbeki is good at, it is dealing with his Western interlocutors. He understood fully, that for them, critical engagement on any issue is driven primarily by national interest, and hardly any altruism.

I first met Mr. Mbeki many years ago - 1981 to be exact, when he was an assistant to Oliver Tambo. We met again in 1984, by then he had become the Director of the Department of Information and Publicity. He was the counterpart to my late friend Comrade Johnstone “Johnny” Mfanafuthi Makatini, Director of ANC's Department of International Affairs and its de facto Foreign Minister. Johnny Makatini was vivacious, bohemian and a gifted orator, who held his audience spellbound with his anti-apartheid rhetoric and persuasive skills. Makatini and Mbeki were the twin arrowheads of ANC’s international engagement. While Makatini was the postulator and spin master, Mbeki was the follow-up fellow whom you asked to parse and decipher the anti-apartheid strategy and plot. It was therefore hardly surprising, that he would step into Makatini’s position in 1989, after the latter died on 3 December 1988 from diabetic complications. It was a role cut out for him.

In the succeeding years, we met at different conferences and rallies. Mbeki was cool, quite and inwardly hard as steel. He was a man on a mission. If he had any singular value for the ANC, it was his renown as mediator, policy shaper and his conversance with the global field of play. Yet, he was not as charismatic as Chris Hani; not as seemingly dogmatic as Joe Modise was, and certainly not as fiery and feared as Patrick “Terror” Lekota -- all these men, his ANC comrades who were deemed successors to the aging gang of Albert Oliver Tambo, Walter Sisulu, and the goaled Nelson Mandela.

It is, therefore, hardly surprising that Mbeki became president of South Africa. He knew Africa well. Likewise, Africans knew and trusted him. Ditto his compatriots and more importantly, Nelson Mandela, his mentor and predecessor.

Many years ago, during negotiations on the international roadmap to end apartheid, I watched Mbeki finesse and run rings around Western diplomats who were unreceptive of Africa’s proposals, contained in the Harare Declaration. A frustratingly deliberate but collaborative negotiator, he believes in navigating around hurdles, while whittling down barriers including the stoic defenses and considered logic of his interlocutors. In the end, he almost always got his way, yet hardly ever showing anger, frustration or raising his voice. It should not surprise anyone, therefore, that he has adopted the same modus operandi in dealing with the Zimbabwe crisis.

This is not the first time that Mbeki has come under severe criticism for his policy options or style. Some international observers have criticized his HIV policy. Indeed, such critics believe that his HIV policy and stance on Zimbabwe will negatively define his legacy. Unfortunately, they are dead wrong.

On the HIV issue, Mbeki knew the score, far better than he would publicly admit or wanted his critics to know. He knew also, that while Western politicians frothed about solving the HIV/AIDS pandemic, their private sector counterparts consistently made HIV drugs unaffordable to peoples in Third World countries, South Africa included. Confronted with that paradox, Mbeki played the West like a fiddle. If they believed in what they preached, he surmised, they should make HIV drugs and treatment not just available, but affordable to South Africans. There were no takers. Hence, he had unmasked Western hypocrisy and double standards on the matter. All talk but no walk!

On Zimbabwe, some Western observers see Mbeki’s ongoing effort as lackluster. Even some within South Africa’s media have decried what The Citizen recently referred to as “Thabo Mbeki’s hand-holding persuasive skill”. Those who do not appreciate or fathom Mbeki’s working methods miss the point, totally, I might add. In addition, they reveal that they hardly know the man.

Mbeki’s role in Zimbabwe should be viewed in the context and with the analogy of someone dealing with a bull in a China shop. Those who seek and therefore push for a quick fix solution, happen also to be the ones that unapologetically push for a regime change by any means. The UK and the US, no longer mask their desire to oust President Mugabe with the usual diplomatic niceties. However, some still do. However, for Mbeki, the question is how to rid the China shop of the bull with minimal collateral damage. The alternative is the total ruin of the shop.

Zimbabwe, admittedly, is in a crisis, but not at war. This really, is what informs Mbeki’s perceptibly gingerly and patient negotiations. Moreover, very few are as cognizant as Mbeki, that the core issue in this crisis –which seems almost forgotten—is land reform. If a crisis of legitimacy exists in Zimbabwe, it did not come from the so-called flawed elections of 27 June. Also, the interlocking crisis has its roots - not in the absence of democracy and good governance, which Zimbabwe always had - but from the domestic land reform dispute, into which the UK had self-servingly insinuated itself. As Mbeki noted recently on BBC’s Hardtalk Show, “There is a land problem in Zimbabwe, there is a need for land redistribution, but it must be handled differently, without violence, without conflict, within the context of the law - bearing in mind the interests of all Zimbabweans, both black and white."

If there is one thing Mbeki learned from Nelson Mandela, it is not to enter any debate or negotiations too early. This was the sure way of building consensus, but also one that allows others to claim ownership of the process and the successful outcome. Apropos Zimbabwe, after what critical jeering nabobs had characterized as Mbeki’s dithering and pussyfooting over an eighteen-month period, he delivered on 21 July, when the parties did the unthinkable and signed an MOU. Mbeki had against all odds, fulfilled the first major role of any facilitator; but the agreement belonged rightly, as it should, to the Zimbabweans.

Yes, Mbeki’s “quiet diplomacy” and “hand-holding” worked. We must give him credit. If the West will not salute him, we in Africa will. Mbeki has our gratitude for navigating with safe hands, the maze and minefield of Zimbabwe’s politics, when already some Westerners were proposing peacekeeping troops. Moreover, he brought the Zimbabweans together to talk about their common destiny. More importantly, thanks to Mbeki, the bull is on its way out of the China shop, and the shop is still intact, even if economically messy. What he has done is save Zimbabwe from implosion, which more sanctions and Western highhandedness would not have readily done. That is reality and reality bites.





August 13, 2008 | 8:53 AM Comments  0 comments
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Bakassi: Time to Seize the Moment
Translations available in: English (original) | French | Spanish | Italian | German | Portuguese | Swedish | Russian | Dutch | Arabic

Bakassi: Time to Seize the Moment

We have set a lesson for Africa and the world.

We have shown that it is possible to resolve a difficult border problem without war

and unnecessary loss of lives and property….

History we remember us all for opting for peace rather than war..

~ President Obasanjo, On Bakassi

Bakassi is an emotive word fraught with controversy. It may be so for a long time, but this coming week, - Thursday 14 August 2008 to be exact - Nigeria will have the unique opportunity to seize the moment and end the Bakassi controversy by taking the moral highroad and upholding the primacy of the rule of law. By handing over the territory of Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon, in keeping the 2002 ruling of the International Court of Justice and the 12 June, 2006 Greentree Agreement, Nigeria would have opted to walk a different path; the peace path, which is not frequently chosen by even civilized nations when issues of territorial integrity crops up.

Like many, I have observed the controversy and partisan politics that surrounds the Bakassi question. I know that many Nigerians oppose the transfer and that there is a muddle of motives not to implement the transfer. Also, in these days of febrile partisan politics and bogus nationalistic fervor, the clamor not to cede the territory perceptibly rings loud and proper. Nevertheless, there are equally enormous compelling reasons to implement the transfer and to do so schedule. Whatever be the case, for and against the handover, I feel personally assured that the time is right for us, as a nation to cut our losses and move on.

On 21 August 2006 during ceremonies marking the formal withdrawal of Nigerian troops from Bakassi, President Obasanjo eloquently articulated why we should not trod the path of conflict akin to what transpired between Argentina and Britain over the Falklands; and why we must opt for peace. His words: “History we remember us all for opting for peace rather than war, embracing harmony rather than discord; celebrating unity and love rather than destruction and chaos, appreciating peace and dialogue rather than promoting uncertainty and insecurity.” Our keeping our end of the bargain would guarantee that Bakassi would henceforth, be a critical benchmark and gauge in international peace and security considerations and resolution of boundary disputes. As UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, noted recently, Bakassi will also “serve as a model for the negotiated settlement of border disputes elsewhere”. Still, there are more dividends to be gained.

First, as a nation, our claim to nationhood has not cracked up to be what we have always hoped. Neither have we been great exemplars in the realm of compliance with the rule of law. Hence, this is a unique opportunity we need not scupper and one, which we can effectively exploit its dividends for long.

Second, for what it may be worth, when the obituary of the Obasanjo Administration is written in its totality, the Greentree Agreement that led to the transfer of Bakassi will be on the positive column of his accomplishments, notwithstanding the emotional drag the matter elicits now.

Third, as Nigerians must honestly contemplate the context, in which Cameroon came to lay claim to Bakassi. Granted that the handling of the matter has been bedeviled by a comedy of errors, what Gen. Babangida said to the Electoral Reform Committee on July 22, 2008 about the awkward nature of military regimes and how they arrive at decisions is noteworthy, and I believe we can also place Bakassi in that context. As Babangida noted: “(I)t must be emphasized that the regime, which it was our privilege to lead, was one of dictatorship... that regime was driven by vision of history of our people and of political challenges … the regime had a mission to create the necessary institutions, structures, processes and environment for a much better system of government to exist. The regime had a “controlled environment” by the fact of military dictatorship”. This reality, unsavory as it may seem, also applies mutatis muntandis, to Bakassi.

As the great French philosopher, Voltaire, once averred with great foresight, “Success is the child of audacity”. As a nation, we should succeed in Bakassi, even if only we see it as the price to pay, in keeping Nigeria as one nation. Nevertheless, we should not stop there. We must contemplate the alternatives – conflict, war, international peacekeeping and even the unthinkable, the disintegration of Nigeria due to a conflict arising from Bakassi. There are many other consequential outcomes.

The historical, legal and cartographic claims aside, we must accept that Bakassi is not about casual or premeditated irredentism on the part of Nigeria or Cameroon. The genesis of the dispute is itself indisputable. Essentially, the dispute is a resultant fait accompli of improper delineation of boundaries by colonial powers following the Berlin Conference of 1884/1885. Also not in contention, is the fact that the setting down of such artificial boundaries were done without due consideration of ethnic and demographic realities on the ground. The reality is that contentions and claims over Bakassi dates back to 1884 and that successive Anglo-German treaties of 1885, 1886, 1913 and the Nigeria-Cameroon Agreements of 1971 and 1975 did not solve the problem.

Hence, Bakassi is a colonial accident, unaddressed by the granting of independence to Nigeria and Cameroon and further compounded by expediency during Nigeria’s civil war, when General Yakubu Gowon, as the head of States and Supreme Commander in a “military dictatorship” signed treaty formally ceding Bakassi to Cameroon. Consequently, since 1981, Nigeria and Cameroon have lost hosts of civilians and soldiers in the spate of intermittent violent encounters arising from claims of ownership of the now oil-rich peninsular.

Whether right or wrong, the fact remains that Gen. Gowon did formally cede Bakassi. Paradoxically, since 1970, all our endeavors seem geared at repudiating and reneging on that singular act, which was legitimate, considering that absolute powers – both executive and legislative – rested with the Supreme Military Council. In fact, our fervor to turn the tables was so conveniently entrenched and blinkered, that when in 1972, Nigeria’s Attorney General and Minister of Justice Dr. Taslim Elias affirmed that in law, reality and according to official government documents within his purview, that Bakassi was not ours, some Nigerians left the core issue and sought to discredit him.

Two notable things have happened since that should spare us any further anguish on this matter. In October 2002, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that the Bakassi Peninsula belonged to Cameroon. In June 2006, President Olusegun Obasanjo and President Paul Biya signed the Greentree (New York) Agreement. After two years, the full implementation of that Agreement will happen with the final transfer of authority in the Bakassi Peninsula from Nigeria to Cameroon, on 14 August.

As we move closer to the full implementation of the Greentree Agreement on 14 August, a cacophony of voices has emerged within Nigeria for and against the transfer of Bakassi. Indeed, an added controversy - a monkey wrench of sorts- emerged with the recent injunction by Justice Mohammed Umar, the presiding judge of an Abuja Federal High Court, directing the Federal Government to suspend forthwith, implementation plans for the handover and to “maintain the status quo …pending the hearing of all applications." It is noteworthy, that this domestic court order, seeks to address unresolved implementation plans and related concerns of some Bakassi indigenes, but does not seek to challenge or repudiate the 2002 International Court of Justice decision on the substantive matter, which is ownership of Bakassi. Clearly, Justice Mohammed Umar knows he has no jurisdiction to entertain the latter.

Vexing as the groundswell of the opposition to the handover may be, we must accept that such is normal in a vibrant democracy. However, there is more at play on how we got to this unenviable juncture. The dilemma we now face was in the first instance created by the erstwhile military regimes’ ask-no-questions mindset – be the Gowon, Obasanjo or Abacha regimes. The same mindset guided President Obasanjo in 2006 to sign the Greentree Agreement without fulfilling the due diligence required by the Constitution.

Several observable fumbles are noteworthy. First, Gen. Gowon’s regime did not gazette the formal ceding of Bakassi to Cameroon; even though Nigeria’s cadastral and cartographic representations including the surveyor-general’s maps had ceased to present Bakassi as being within Nigeria. Second, whereas the ICJ did not bother to direct the conduct of a plebiscite in Bakassi, President Obasanjo did not also include a plebiscite for the Bakassi people in the Greentree Agreement, which would have offered the denizens of the peninsula the choice of belonging to Nigeria or to Cameroon, without prejudice to Cameroon getting the peninsula. Third, although President Obasanjo ex-post facto advised the National Assembly of the Greentree Agreement, he did not press or push for its formal ratification as an international treaty as required by the Constitution. Fourth, the National Assembly, for its part, has not deemed it a priority to ratify the Greentree Agreement or pass a motion signaling its intention to withhold its consent. Finally, President Yar’Adua is yet to make a broadcast to Nigerians lining out his position on the matter and underlining why Nigeria must uphold the ICJ ruling and the Greentree Agreement.

Cumulatively, these governance and administrative lapses give merit to the arguments advanced by those who oppose the transfer of Bakassi. They are not necessarily against a negotiated settlement or amity, but seek due diligence and due process, as well as the respect of their rights as the Nigerian government seeks to exercise its right of eminent domain in the national interests. Furthermore, these claims underpin the fact that a procedural and substantive lacuna exists in the full and formal implementation of the Greentree Agreement, since as required by law it has not been ratified. After all, as John Newton observed, “an act against the Constitution is void; and act against natural equity is void”. What is utterly inexplicable is why we have fumbled so badly on Bakassi, d